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Abstract. This article analyses the mechanisms establishing time consistency of constitutions. It 
explains why shorter and more locked constitutions are more likely to be time consistent (change less) 
and that long constitutions are more time inconsistent (change more, despite locking). Empirical 
evidence from all of the democratic countries in the world indicates that the length and locking of 
constitutions are not independent criteria, and that their combination leads to less time consistency. To 
address this inter-relationship, a measure of time inconsistency (a combination of locking and 
amendment rate) is developed and it is demonstrated that it is connected with the length of 
constitutions. The article shows how time inconsistency is incompatible with theories of 
‘constitutional amendment culture’ not only at the theoretical level, but also empirically. Finally, the 
article proves that the empirical finding that the length of constitutions is related to lower per capita 
income and higher corruption are not only in agreement with time inconsistency arguments, but this 
also extends beyond OECD countries to all democracies. 
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Introduction 
 
This article studies constitutional revision provisions at the theoretical level. Country constitutions 
systematically involve two categories of items: individual rights, and the rules of the political game. 
The emphasis is on the word ‘systematically’ because constitutions may also include other elements.1 
Individual rights and the rules of the political game in a democracy must be well known in advance 
and respected by all participants in the political game – that is, they require time consistency. For this 
reason, constitutions protect their text from change by making modification difficult. Indeed, 
constitutions include provisions requiring qualified majorities of one body or concurrent majorities of 
several bodies in order to be modified. Sometimes both restrictions are required, and sometimes 
additional restrictions involving repeated votes, time constraints or participation requirements are also 
present.  
While locking in order to avoid modification seems to be a commonsense argument for the 
creation of a constitution, this logic is not confirmed empirically by analyses of constitutional locking 
and amendment data – and it is sometimes even disputed theoretically in the literature. Rasch and 
Congleton (2006: 549), for example, argue: ‘Clearly, there may be much more to be learned about the 
relationship between amendment rates and amendment procedures.’ In a more forceful way, Ginsburg 
and Melton (2015: 691) dispute whether the amendment rules matter at all and ‘go on to develop a 
measure of amendment culture as an alternative to institutional factors that constrain amendment’.  
I develop a model that combines constitutional rigidity and amendment frequency into a 
concept called ‘time inconsistency’ (i.e., the rate of change of constitutions, despite their locking). 
This model disputes the theoretical validity of the ‘amendment culture’ argument. I find that time 
inconsistency correlates with the length of constitutions in all democratic countries.  
The article is organised as follows. First, I present the interaction, in game form, between the 
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founders of a constitution and the subsequent generations that may choose to revise it. Then, I explore 
the constitutional ‘locking’ mechanisms and show their impact on the constitutional provisions. 
Because of locking, changes in constitutional provisions require overwhelming agreement in 
democratic countries. I go on to empirically examine the combination of three elements of 
constitutions in 92
2
 democratic countries (scoring > 6 on the Polity 2 scale): constitutional rigidity 
(locking), amendment rate and length of the constitution. I produce new measures of constitutional 
rigidity based on the constitutional restrictions of amendments. My measures extend previous 
institutional literature (Anckar & Karvonen 2002; Lijphart 1999; Lorenz 2005; Lutz 1994; Rasch & 
Congleton 2006) to cover all 92 democratic countries in a consistent way. My measures depart from 
the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) (Elkins et al. 2009; also used by Tsebelis & Nardi 
2016), which includes institutional as well as economic and social variables (like ethnic 
fractionalization and economic development). Bucur and Rasch (2017) criticise results based on non-
institutional measures arguing: ‘The more difficult the procedure, the less frequent changes to the 
constitution become.’ Tsebelis and Nardi (2016) surprisingly find a positive relationship in the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (significant only after 
control for length). Because they use the non-institutional measure of rigidity from CCP, their result is 
hard to trust. Ginsburg and Melton (2015) depart from these measures separating institutional from 
social and economic variables, and argue that constitutional restrictions do not matter at all for 
amendment frequency. Their argument is that amendment frequency can be explained by amendment 
culture. I develop the concept of ‘time inconsistency’ (a combination of constitutional rigidity and 
amendment frequency), measure it and find that it is positively related to the length of a constitution. I 
argue that the time inconsistency approach is incompatible both theoretically and empirically with the 
amendment culture approach. In the final part of the article I examine the implications of the time 
inconsistency argument, and find that claims by Tsebelis and Nardi (2016) that, in OECD countries, 
constitutional length is associated with lower per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and higher 
corruption are corroborated in all 92 democracies.  
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The intergenerational constitutional game 
 
The founders of each constitution want to generate a document that will regulate the interactions of 
the political game for generations to come. Whether it is the rights of citizens or the interaction among 
political actors, these rules have to be known and respected (and therefore seen to be stable) by all 
political actors. On the other hand, if unforeseeable circumstances arise, these constitutional rules 
have to permit amendment. This is why there are constitutional provisions about the requirements for 
a constitutional revision. 
The theoretical debate in constitutional design is between two major options with regards to 
the time horizon of constitutions: either one anchored to and shaped by the citizens it serves, or one 
that stands the test of time. The former perspective represents that of Thomas Jefferson; the latter that 
of James Madison. The two addressed a fundamental question of the role played not only by a 
nation’s governing document – a constitution – but also the relation of the governors to the governed: 
Who decides the rules of the game? Are the living to be ruled, as Jefferson argued, by themselves in a 
revisited document, or by their forbearers through an enduring document? 
Jefferson supported constitutional replacement every generation to allow citizens to revisit 
institutions and rules, adapting them to changing circumstances. He supported replacing (or at least 
some form of re-evaluating) constitutional bargains every generation (about every nineteen years), 
which is, as Elkins et al. (2009: 129) note, the median survival time of constitutions in their sample. 
Madison, however, took issue with such a suggestion, arguing against instability and in favour of 
longevity. A government worthy of respect, in Madison’s view, is one that is both faithful to its 
citizens’ wishes, as well as one that remains steadfast in the face of short-lived fads and whimsical 
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ideas. Additionally, longstanding constitutions are more stable and less susceptible to the ‘ambition or 
corruption of one’ and the ‘sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few’ (Madison 1982 [1788]). 
Figure 1 provides the game form of the considerations of founders and future generations. 
The founders have to decide on three different issues: (1) whether to include a subject matter in the 
constitution; (2) whether to include many provisions on the subject and make it restrictive; and (3) 
how much to lock it in order to protect it against revisions. Each country gives different answers to 
these questions. This is why subjects that exist in some constitutions are absent in others, and the 
locking mechanisms are different not only across countries, but even inside the same constitution 
(usually articles are divided into two groups: the ones that are not amendable and the ones that can be 
amended under specific rules). Of the 92 democratic constitutions included in my sample and coded 
by the CCP, 35 contain provisions detailing non-amendable portions.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
For future generations, the question of a constitutional revision may arise and the occurrence 
will be more frequent the more subjects and detailed provisions the founders opted to incorporate. The 
success of such attempts at revision will be higher the less locked the constitution is (a topic I turn to 
later in this article).
3
 
In the figure I have indicated with bold letters all the choices that lead to sub-game perfect 
equilibria in this game form. One choice that does not lead to such equilibrium, however, is the 
combination of constitutional detail (including a large number of provisions) and a failure to lock 
them sufficiently, along with the willingness of future generations to modify the constitutional 
provisions. 
The usual term in the economic literature for the description of such equilibria that are not 
sub-game perfect is ‘time inconsistent’. Economic theory has, since Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) 
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Nobel Prize winning article, ‘Rules Rather than Discretion’, held that time inconsistency ought to be 
avoided in economic policy making. This is the standard reason that countries delegate monetary 
policy to central banks: to take it away from the hands of a government who will change preferences 
as a function of electoral cycles. This argument has been propagated in the creation of many other 
independent authorities as well, including environmental protection, mass media and medical 
regulations.  
If institutions are created in order to avoid time inconsistency in policies, time inconsistency, 
a fortiori, should be avoided with respect to the rules of the game – that is, the constitution. In other 
words, constitutions that change often are subject to discretion rather than rules.
4
 On the basis of 
Figure 1, one can see that long constitutions (involving many and detailed provisions) may lead to 
time inconsistent outcomes. Despite their locking, they may lead future generations to overcome the 
obstacles and revise the constitution. 
 
Theory: ‘Locking’ mechanisms and the protection of constitutions 
 
While ordinary legislation usually requires a simple majority to be approved, constitutional provisions 
are ‘locked’ in that they require a wide variety of hurdles for their modification, such as: qualified 
majorities of a legislature or a constituent assembly (e.g., Portugal and South Africa); the presence of 
a quorum (e.g., Belgium and Colombia); approval by several bodies (e.g., a house and a senate, or an 
elected president, as in Mexico); a referendum (e.g., Switzerland); the same institution(s) to adopt the 
same text multiple times (e.g., Bulgaria and Brazil); and the introduction of an election between the 
two approvals (e.g., Finland and Sweden). They may also introduce several combinations of the above 
and/or permit alternative routes for approval of amendments. For example, the Italian constitution 
requires either simple majorities in both chambers of the legislature followed by a referendum, or 
two-thirds majorities in both chambers.  
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I will explain the impact of such requirements. Assume a seven-member body that requires a 
qualified majority of five or six members for an amendment to be adopted, as in Figure 2. Under a 5/7 
majority, there is no possibility of adopting a proposal to the left of member 3, or to the right of 
member 5, as long as members can introduce their own amendments. If the status quo is in the area 3–
5, it cannot be upset by an alternative proposal (there is no possible 5/7 majority against it). If the 
status quo is outside this area, several points inside this interval can defeat it. Under a 6/7 majority, 
this area expands to the 2–6 interval. The formal name of this area, where points cannot be defeated 
by applying the required (qualified majority) decision-making rule, is the ‘core’ (Berl et al. 1976). In 
the remainder of this article, since constitutional amendment require special conditions, I will refer to 
the ‘constitutional core’. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To simplify matters, first I replicate the argument in Tsebelis and Nardi (2016), in one 
dimension; then, I move to multiple dimensions and multiple approval bodies, as well as differences 
in opinions among members of the same party. I later explain how all these factors shape my strategy 
of empirical investigation (universe of cases, dependent variable, as well as exclusion of other 
variables existing in the literature).  
The only way for constitutional revisions to become an option in a democratic polity is if a 
point that had been inside this core is now located outside of it. In other words, a constitutional 
revision can involve only points (and provisions) that used to be centrally located inside the body 
politic of a democratic country but are not anymore. This argument limits the analysis to democratic 
countries only, because any constitutional changes in an authoritarian regime are not predicated on a 
change in preferences of the population at large. 
This change can occur only with significant modification of the positions of the individual 
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players (or an exogenous shock that makes the previous positions no longer tenable).
5
 Figure 3 
presents such a modification: five of the seven members of Figure 2 have changed and moved to the 
right (some significantly so, like Players 5, 6 and 7, who moved beyond the previous political space, 
since points 5’, 6’ and 7’ are beyond 7). This is a political shift so radical that it is difficult to imagine 
in any real polity except during a revolution.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Despite this shift, there is considerable overlap between the old 5/7 core and the new 5/7 core. 
If constitutional amendment requires a 5/7 majority, the only provisions that could be revised are 
those falling in the (3, 3’) area. Yet if the required majority for constitutional revision is 6/7, then 
there is no possibility of such a modification. Thus, even in the face of extreme changes in the 
political space, no change is possible under a 6/7 majority. Constitutional change requires a point of 
the previous constitutional core (an article or section of the existing constitution) to be located outside 
the polity’s current core.  
Let me now move to cases of multiple bodies, multiple dimensions and differences in opinion 
of members of the same party. There are two reasons why I am generalising in all these dimensions. 
First, doing so addresses arguments that the ideological distance between chambers affects the size of 
the core. Indeed, as Tsebelis (2016) shows in the Italian context, changing the mode of election of the 
senate is likely to increase its ideological distance from the house, and make future constitutional 
revisions more difficult. The second reason for generalizing is to address arguments made by Negretto 
(2012) that ideological diversity within parties may facilitate constitutional revisions, since necessary 
votes may be found by different legislators. Figure 4 demonstrates that both arguments are correct.  
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[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To simplify matters, consider a constitution that requires for its modification a 3/4 majority in 
both chambers (A and B) along with half of the members of a third body (either legislator P or 
legislator Q). The constitutional core of legislature A is the whole triangle A (any point inside it 
cannot be modified by a 3/4 majority). Similarly, the constitutional core of legislature B is the whole 
triangle B. In addition, any point between A and B cannot be modified by the required 3/4 bicameral 
majority. The bicameral core is thus area A1, B1, B2, B3, A3, A2. If the vote of legislator P was 
required, the shaded area extending to the point P would have been the constitutional core. An 
identical argument can be made about legislator Q. However, what is needed is only one of the two 
votes. As a result, the core (the set of points that cannot be modified) is the intersection of the two 
cores. The figure demonstrates that if the ideological distance of the two chambers increases (the 
legislatures A and B move away from each other), the constitutional core expands (in agreement with 
the argument in Tsebelis’ (2016) argument) while the difference of opinions of the two legislators will 
decrease the size of the core (Negretto’s (2012) argument). 
 
Implications and data collection 
 
The above analysis leads to two major conclusions: constitutional amendments are out of (perfect) 
equilibrium behaviour; and such amendments are a difficult enterprise. However, neither of these 
conclusions is uncontroversial in the literature. This is why I will discuss them in detail. I first address 
alternative approaches and then explain the implications for data collection. 
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Constitutional amendments are out of equilibrium  
 
The text of a constitution is supposed to be applied the way it is written. In case parts of it are unclear 
or imprecise and disputes are created, the interpretation is left to the courts. If a major problem arises 
that the constitution is unable to address, a constitutional amendment is in order. This amendment has 
to be created on the basis of the rules specified inside the constitution (the locking mechanism). 
Some scholars of constitutional law challenge the distinction between constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional amendment. In particular, they argue that major court decisions and 
major constitutional amendments are ‘functionally equivalent’ in that they both change status quo 
constitutional policy. For instance, writing about the American case, Ackerman (1991) argues that 
justices make amendment-level decisions in cases when public opinion clamours for change. Given 
that ratification in three-quarters of the American states is required for formal amendment, he argues, 
even strong movements in favour of constitutional change are often stymied. In order to placate the 
public, then, judges make monumental decisions that essentially ‘amend’ the constitution. Cases like 
the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education provide an example of this phenomenon.  
Other scholars agree with and build upon Ackerman’s assertion. Amar (1994) goes so far as 
to assert that citizens possess a ‘self-evident’ right to amend their constitution – even outside the 
formal amendment process. According to Amar, Article V of the American constitution does not 
establish the formal amendment process as the only amendment process, thereby allowing for other 
means of constitutional amendment – presumably including major judicial interpretations – to achieve 
the same ‘status’ as a formal constitutional amendment. In his book, The People Themselves, Kramer 
(2004) argues that, in fact, judges have gained too much constitutional authority through their power 
of interpretation. The people, he says, should have the final ‘say’ about constitutional policy – not the 
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courts. Whittington (2009) echoes a similar sentiment, though from an originalist perspective: because 
judges have become so powerful (because judicial interpretation has risen so close to the 
consequentiality of formal amendment), judicial activism has actually depressed the people’s 
propensity to push for constitutional amendment. 
The notion that major judicial interpretations are functionally equivalent to constitutional 
amendment is not without its opponents, of course. In particular, most originalists resist such a strong 
view of judicial interpretation, instead arguing that justices provide only clarification – not policy 
change. However, my argument has nothing to do with ‘functional equivalence’ (which I do not 
dispute) or judicial activism (which I cannot define) or the rules that should regulate judicial decision 
making. I argue that judicial interpretation is inside the constitutional equilibrium, while constitutional 
amendment is not a (perfect) equilibrium. The constitution relies on judicial interpretation, while 
amendments imply that the text itself needed change. In terms of judicial decision making, even if 
judges interpret the constitution ‘inappropriately’ according to analysts, they still behave in 
equilibrium – that is, on the basis of the powers ascribed to them by the constitution. In case the 
political system (people, elected representatives) disagree with the current constitutional equilibrium, 
they can move out of it and amend the constitution. This was the case, for example, in the ‘fair trial’ 
constitutional act introduced in Italy in 1999 (Tsebelis 2016). 
 
Constitutional amendments are difficult to achieve 
 
Constitutional amendments, by definition, are required to be outside the constitutional core in order to 
be successful. The larger the core, the more difficult it becomes to amend the constitution. Every 
restriction that a constitution has in place for its amendment will enlarge the core. Whether enlarging 
through qualified majorities, requiring approval by more than one body, asking for double votes 
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within specified time intervals (or the opposite: preventing a second vote before some specific time), 
asking for elections to be held between two votes, requiring specific levels of participation, or any 
other means, such restrictions make constitutional amendments more difficult to achieve. 
Consequently, the rules of amendment are extremely important. As Burgess (1890: 137) put it: ‘[The] 
[a]mending clause … describes and regulates … amending power. This is the most important part of 
the constitution.’  
 
Amendments cannot be explained by ‘amendment culture’ 
 
In a recent article, Ginsburg and Melton (2015) depart from the measures of constitutional flexibility 
they had proposed in their pioneering book, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Elkins et al. 
2009) and CCP. The authors do so because measures of constitutional flexibility (or rigidity) have low 
correlation among them, and they do not seem to affect the frequency of successful constitutional 
amendments. The CCP had created a measure of flexibility (or rigidity) involving not only 
constitutional provisions (like the rest of the literature), but also a series of additional variables, 
including ethnic heterogeneity, economic development, domestic crisis, economic crisis, territory gain 
or loss, and defeat in war. Even in the constitutional variables, CCP has included a series of factors 
unrelated to amendment procedures, such as inclusiveness, an indicator for a unitary executive, 
parliamentary power and judicial review. These variables are included because of the authors’ belief 
that constitutional rigidity is not only a theoretical matter, but also an empirical one.  
Given the low (and sometimes negative) correlation with other institutional measures of 
rigidity, Ginsburg and Melton decided to separate the institutional factors that most of the literature 
refers to (I will address this point below) and examine the possibility that ‘amendment culture’ is 
instead responsible for constitutional amendments. In their words, ‘that attitude toward amendment 
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will be expressed through amendment practices, and that these attitudes will endure in the form of 
norms that outlast any particular set of constitutions’ (Ginsburg & Melton 2015: 707; emphasis 
added).  
However, whether or not actors have norms, habits or ‘amendment culture’ (to use Ginsburg 
and Melton terminology), they will nevertheless have to clear the constitutional thresholds in order to 
act upon these concepts – and they will certainly be frustrated by other actors with opposing interests 
whose votes will be required according to the constitution. Therefore, the bottom line for analysis in 
any democracy will have to be the constitutional provisions themselves. Due to the fact that the size 
of the core is generally quite large, and the only parts of a constitution that can be amended are 
provisions that belong in the new core but not in the old one (Figure 3), constitutional amendments 
are as difficult as the constitution specifies – even if there is a ‘constitutional culture’ suggesting 
otherwise. In other words, culture may be in conflict with minor institutional provisions, but it 
certainly will not be in conflict with constitutional rules.
6
 
Ginsburg and Melton approximate ‘amendment culture’ by the frequency of amendments to 
the previous constitution. First, while ‘culture’ is a very imprecise term, the particular choice although 
very creative, may be objectionable to proponents of cultural approaches because it essentially 
equates ‘culture’ with ‘inertia’. Second, and more important, this measurement is perplexing as it 
makes little sense for political actors to determine their behaviour on the basis of rules that are not 
supposed to regulate their behaviour. For example, textbooks on French politics treat the Fourth and 
Fifth Republics (after the constitutional change of 1958) as different countries despite the fact that the 
French ‘culture’ (whatever one might mean by the expression) was not significantly impacted. Thus, 
arguments about inertia (or, in Ginsburg and Melton terms: ‘amendment culture’) cannot be part of an 
equilibrium analysis.  
But, what if the basis of the Ginsburg and Melton argument is not theoretical validity but 
empirical accuracy? And what if this empirical accuracy matters more than equilibrium analysis? 
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After all, in the empirical portion of their paper, Ginsburg and Melton (2015) regress the frequency of 
constitutional revisions on its lagged value (as well as on constitutional provisions of revision) and 
find strong and significant results for their lagged dependent variable (amendment culture) and 
insignificant results (including wrong signs) for the institutional variables.  
The results are disputable on empirical grounds. As Achen (2000: 1) argues: 
 
When one or more lagged values of the dependent variable are added ‘as a control’ … in 
many instances the autoregressive terms are strongly significant and the fit improves sharply, 
but the original sensible substantive effects of other variables disappear. This pattern 
frequently occurs even when the lagged variables have no plausible causal interpretation.
7
  
 
This result (as Achen demonstrates) occurs because, if there is a time trend, the inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable picks the time trend up not only from the omitted variables, but also from 
the included ones. 
Ginsburg and Melton (2015) do not have an entire time-series analysis – just one step. It is 
likely, however, that the amendment rules of the current constitution will be dependent on the ones of 
the previous constitution, particularly if these rules are finely defined like Ginsburg and Melton have 
done (amendment threshold, number of proposers, number of approvers, multiple sessions required, 
judicial review are all independent variables).
8
 It is this serial dependence that is picked up by the 
amendment frequency of the previous constitution, as well as other omitted variables, such as 
economic development and ethnic divisions, which are not included in the particular Ginsburg and 
Melton model, but are present in the CCP analysis. I simulated a model like this
9
 and confirmed 
Achen’s expectations: the only variable that matters in the model is the lagged dependent variable, 
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whose coefficient is inflated. The other variables (dummies, in my case) had no significance either 
and sometimes exhibited wrong signs. Thus, besides the lack of theoretical foundation, the results 
about inertia or ‘amendment culture’ lack empirical validity.  
 
Time inconsistency and the necessary variables for empirical analysis 
 
There are two findings in the empirical literature replicated by my variables. First, the relation 
between constitutional rigidity and frequency of constitutional amendments is conflictual, as 
demonstrated above, but also tenuous (e.g., Elkins et al. 2009; Ginsburg & Melton 2015; see also 
Appendix Figure 1). As we saw above, the very reason that Ginsburg and Melton introduced their 
‘amendment culture’ variable is the lack of a pronounced negative relationship between locking and 
amendment frequency generated by equilibrium analysis. Second, there is a strong relationship 
between length of constitution and frequency of amendments (Elkins et al. 2009; Lutz 1994, 2006; 
Negretto 2012; see Appendix Figure 2).
10
 This relationship is considered to be ‘obvious’ since more 
provisions will generate more need for revisions (see Lijphart 1999: 207; Lutz 1994: 357, 359; Rasch 
& Congleton 2006: 542). If these findings are taken separately from each other, they generate 
misleading impressions (as we saw in the Ginsburg and Melton analysis).  
The real question is whether constitutional rigidity compensates for the multiplicity of 
provisions – that is, whether locking a constitution protects against the need to revise it frequently. 
For this reason, I calculate time inconsistency in two steps: first, I calculate an expected frequency of 
amendments on the basis of institutions; and second, I find the difference between actual frequency of 
amendments and the expected one (on institutional grounds). The actual frequency is the number of 
years a constitution was changed over its democratic lifetime.
11
 I use democratic amendments to count 
how often the mechanism of constitutional change was activated in a successful way (unsuccessful 
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attempts at modification are not counted). This difference between actual and expected (on 
institutional grounds) frequency is the measure of time inconsistency.  
The above theoretical arguments restrict the universe of my dataset to democracies only. 
Indeed, the argument that constitutional revisions require overwhelming support from the population 
or legislative bodies implies correspondence among preferences of the people and of legislators, or at 
least the independence of opinions of legislators. It cannot be argued that constitutional revisions in 
Gaddafi’s Libya (if any) were approved by the overwhelming majority of the people. By considering 
all democracies, one significantly expands the universe of analysis of previous studies (with the 
exception of the CCP project).  
My dependent variable (frequency of revisions) measures how many times such procedures 
were successfully applied over the life of the country’s current constitution. If several amendments 
occur the same year, they are counted as one because most likely they happened in the same 
constitutional revision. How amendments are characterised and evaluated has varied in the literature: 
other analyses try to identify how important changes were by identifying the average number of 
amendments over time (Lorenz 2005), measuring certain types of amendments only (Gutmann et al. 
2011), or the success rate of amendment attempts (as Lutz (1994) uses for his index of amendment 
difficulty). There are, as Rasch (2008) emphasises, many different ways one might operationalise the 
significance of amendment: by articles, words, or numbers of articles changed. Ginsburg and Melton 
(2015) illustrate how difficult it is to evaluate the substantive effect of amendments on a document 
when looking at the similarity of the document to itself before and after amendments: changing a few 
words may have a large impact on how the country functions, as in the case of Spain’s amendment to 
Article 135 of its constitution (balanced budget for public organisations). This sentiment is echoed in 
the work by Elkins et al. (2009: 56), who show that while there is a wide variance in constitutional 
similarity before and after replacement, there is still considerable variation after amendments among 
some documents. My measure of frequency of revisions is the same as Negretto’s (2012), as well as 
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one of the two measures used by Ginsburg and Melton (2015). 
I have created new measures of ‘constitutional rigidity’. Many measures of constitutional 
rigidity exist already – most of them based on constitutional rules alone (Anckar & Karvonen 2002; 
Rasch & Congleton 2006; Lijphart 1999; Lorenz 2005; Lutz 1994). The CCP dataset (Elkins et al. 
2009) uses not only variables included in the constitution, but other social and economic variables as 
well, as noted earlier. As a result, Ginsburg and Melton (2015: Table 3) find a negative correlation 
between the CCP measure of ‘amendment difficulty’ and some of the institutional indicators produced 
by the other authors. Given that there has been no study using constitutional provisions alone that 
covers all democracies, I had to create new indicators. My data are calculated as of 2013 and include 
all 92 constitutions in effect in democracies in 2013.  
While in many ways more complete than existing datasets, my data make a few omissions. 
First, the scope of the current enterprise (covering 92 countries) will lead me to omit policy positions. 
Earlier in this article I underscored arguments in the literature (e.g., Negretto, Tsebelis) that focus not 
only on constitutional provisions, but also on the policy positions of different actors (both collective 
and individual). While I believe these arguments to be correct, it was not feasible to collect such 
information for all 92 countries.
12
 Another omission I make is to exclude from my calculations time 
delays, quorum requirements or intermediate elections. While these amendment restrictions are 
consequential, they are not as important as the number of (institutional) actors involved in revision or 
the required majorities. I will use these two variables independently, and try to triangulate the concept 
of constitutional rigidity in all 92 democratic countries that this article covers.  
I calculate new measures of ‘constitutional rigidity’ in the following three ways. First, I take 
the percentage requirement for constitutional revisions in the relevant legislative institution. For most 
countries, this value is the same, regardless of whether there is one house or two. There are three 
notable exceptions: Burundi, Poland and Austria. The first two have different thresholds for the two 
houses, while the third excludes the senate from constitutional revisions (unless related to federalism). 
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In these cases, the more stringent requirement is used. For example, in Burundi, 4/5 of members in the 
lower house must approve, while 2/3 of members in the upper house must give their assent. Here, I 
use the 4/5 threshold for both houses for simplicity. Thresholds range from a simple majority 
(represented as 50) to 80 per cent as described in Burundi.  
A second way of measuring rigidity is to use a categorical variable (1 for 50 per cent, 2 for 60 
per cent, etc.). The values for this variable range from 1 to 5. 
A third means of capturing the rigidity of a constitution is to determine how many bodies are 
required to approve a constitutional change. For example, it may be that both legislative chambers and 
the head of state are required to approve amendments. In this case, the number of approving bodies 
would equal three. The addition of a public referendum adds an additional body. In these calculations, 
the focus is on amendments to constitutions that did not refer to domains with higher amendment 
thresholds. Some countries, such as Finland, require only one body’s assent for changes (the 
unicameral Eduskunta), while other countries require many, including Switzerland, which requires 
approval in both houses and the cantons, as well as the people. The values for this variable range from 
1 to 4. 
Such variables have been used by the literature for a limited number of countries, and 
produced conflicting results: Ferejohn (1997: 523) examined 30 countries and found no evidence that 
referendums or approval by the states (i.e., the number of veto players) has any impact on the 
frequency of amendments, while Rasch and Congleton (2006) examined 19 countries and found that 
special majorities in the legislature have no discernible effect on amendment rates. My goal is that 
expanding the dataset to 92 countries and using all three indicators will permit me to get a better 
understanding of the underlying relationship. 
Table 1 demonstrates that for all three measures of rigidity, time inconsistency is highly 
dependent on the length of the constitution. Table 1 investigates the cases of both OECD countries 
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and all democracies, and shows that the expectations are consistent across the two sets of countries 
and across the three different ways that constitutional rigidity (and consequently time inconsistency) 
is measured.
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The variable of time inconsistency measures how many times a certain constitution was 
driven out of equilibrium – that is, was modified despite its locking. The table indicates that the slope 
of OECD countries is steeper than other democracies. In other words, while constitutional rigidity 
increases with length in OECD countries, it remains practically constant across democratic countries. 
The frequency of amendments, however, increases with length across all democracies. As a result, 
there is a positive relationship between length and time inconsistency: overall, longer constitutions 
have a higher combination of rigidity and frequency of amendment.  
 
Other correlations of length (GDP per capita, corruption) 
 
As I have indicated earlier in this article, constitutional revisions have high requirements. Yet, long 
constitutions are more frequently changed and demonstrate higher time inconsistency. In order to 
explain this time inconsistency, one needs to first understand the characteristics of long constitutions, 
and then identify other factors that are associated with them.  
 
What is length? 
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Constitutions can include three different kinds of provisions. First, constitutional provisions can 
regulate technical or innocuous matters that do not influence political behaviour. Second, 
constitutions can contain aspirational goals, such as the right to work (included in many post Second 
World War constitutions), which do not impose any specific obligations on the government and are 
consequently not judicially enforceable (unsurprisingly, none of these countries has completely 
eradicated unemployment). Third, constitutions contain restrictive or prescriptive statements, such as 
sections detailing government structure and citizens’ rights. While these three categories might be 
straightforward at the theoretical level, empirically there is no reliable way of distinguishing between 
constitutions that contain many substantive restrictions and those that are simply garrulous (Voigt 
2009). Yet, the frequency of amendments, along with the difficulty of achieving such modifications, 
indicates that long constitutions are restrictive because a country would not undertake the significant 
or formidable efforts required for amendments if they were not deemed necessary. In other words, 
constitutional amendments are more likely to be made on restrictive provisions – not on innocuous 
ones. On the other hand, it is conceivable that new issues of wide agreement (like equality of women) 
are included at some point in old constitutions. Such provisions may or may not be enforceable. Chile 
is in the process of writing a new constitution, and there are debates whether it should include free 
education as one of the rights. Obviously, such an inclusion cannot possibly resolve the financial 
dimension of the problem. It will certainly invite judicial activism as a first step reaction, but then, it 
could also lead to responses by the political system to the remarks (and decisions) of the judiciary. 
Ginsburg and Melton (2015: 690) demonstrate that the number of constitutional amendments across 
the world has dramatically increased since the middle of the last century, and they attribute this to the 
fact that the ‘rate of social and technological change is high and likely to continue to accelerate’ 
(Ginsburg & Melton 2015: 688).  
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The inclusion of more issues or more restrictions leads to the question of whether length is 
mainly the result of many topics with little discussion, very detailed discussion of a few topics, or 
some combination of both. The CCP dataset makes the distinction between the ‘scope’ of a 
constitution (i.e., the number of selected subjects included in it) and its ‘detail’ (i.e., the number of 
words used to cover each subject on average). Obviously, the length of every constitution is the 
product of the two. Given this logical relationship, a regression predicting the length of a constitution, 
as a function of scope, detail and their interaction, would provide a coefficient of one for the product 
term, and an R
2
 of 1. In other words, both variables cannot be used in the same equation. Yet, it is 
known in the literature that more recent constitutions have larger scope (i.e., address more subjects); 
therefore, I can use the age of the constitution as a proxy for scope, provided this variable is 
uncorrelated with detail. Figure 5 indicates that this is the case in all the countries of the world 
(regardless of whether they are a democracy or not). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
It is possible to identify the characteristics associated with length using the age of the 
constitution as a proxy for its scope. Table 2 (as well as Appendix Figure 1) examines the variables 
associated in the literature with length of constitutions, focusing first upon OECD member countries 
(to re-examine Tsebelis & Nardi (2016) with more recent data) and all democracies. The variables I 
examine are age, detail, federalism and legal origins. The difference between the data analysis for 
OECD countries and all democracies is that federalism in democracies is associated with length, while 
it is independent from length in OECD countries. The conclusion is that across all democratic 
countries of the world, constitutional length is associated with more restrictions (‘detail’ in Table 2), 
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more amendments (Appendix Figure 2) and with more time inconsistency (Figure 5 and Appendix 
Figure 3).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
What is associated with constitutional length? 
 
For long constitutions to be more time inconsistent (i.e., to exhibit a higher number of amendments, 
despite locking), it must be that they lead to serious impediments to the political game in the 
corresponding countries. Tsebelis and Nardi (2016) identified two important correlates of 
constitutional length in OECD countries: per capita GDP, and corruption.  
Long constitutions are restrictive and, as such, they prevent the adoption of policies desirable 
to the populations they regulate. This is the reason for frequent constitutional amendments. One 
aggregate variable that would cause generalised dissatisfaction and frequent constitutional revisions 
would be low per capita GDP. Table 3 corroborates the inverse relationship between constitutional 
length and GDP per capita (a relationship depicted graphically in Appendix Figure 4). This 
relationship maintains high significance even if one controls for the usual economic variables of 
natural resources, trade and investment, as well as education.
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[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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With respect to corruption, Tsebelis and Nardi (2016) argue that causal links could be 
pointing in both directions. On the one hand, it could be that founders are captured by special interests 
who are asking for additional detailed provisions to be locked so that their privileges would be 
guaranteed. Alternatively, it may be that virtuous founders tried to include detailed provisions in order 
to prevent or reduce the influence of organised interests. Figure 6 depicts the strong correlation 
(significant at the 0.001 level) between constitutional length and corruption.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Tsebelis and Nardi (2016) also anticipated that these relations would be clearer in OECD 
countries because these countries respect their constitutions and, consequently, safer inferences can be 
made from the study of OECD countries. This expectation is corroborated in both Table 3 
(significance of length for all democracies is lower than for OECD countries) and Figure 6 (slope of 
democratic countries is lower than OECD). 
In Table 4, I include corruption as an independent control variable (in addition to the 
education and the economic ones). First, I replicate Tsebelis and Nardi’s results (in column 3 for 
OECD countries with the updated 2013 data) and expand to all democracies (in column 4). This 
inclusion removes the statistical significance of length on GDP, just as in the Tsebelis and Nardi 
(2016). Tsebelis and Nardi then used ‘detail’ instead of length (along with number of amendments) as 
their independent variable. Table 5 replicates those results and demonstrates that they hold not only 
for OECD, but for all democratic countries.  
 
[INSERT TABLES 4 & 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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However, the Tsebelis and Nardi tests are very stringent because they assume independence 
of length and corruption, which is a mistaken assumption as Figure 6 indicates. Consequently, length 
(or detail) will have both a direct and indirect (via corruption) effect on GDP per capita. The correct 
way, statistically speaking, of estimating the aggregate effect would be through mediation analysis. I 
will not pursue this enterprise here. Suffice it to say that statistical significance of ‘length’ or ‘detail’ 
will increase.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This article demonstrates that long constitutions are restrictive. Given the difficulty of performing 
constitutional revisions, such revisions are not likely to be undertaken without reason. They are likely 
to affect enforceable provisions that are hindering government majorities from acting the way they 
judge appropriate. In this sense, they are constraining majorities from deciding according to their 
wishes; they are confronting the democratic expression of the representatives of the people. Long 
constitutions are not just garrulous (Voigt 2009). The fact that a constitution is revised may be 
because it was so designed – that is, it has not been locked enough. However, I have shown here that 
the length of constitutions across all democratic countries of the world is correlated with time 
inconsistency – that is, the combination of locking and amendment frequency.   
I began with an equilibrium analysis of the constitutional amendment provisions and showed 
that if constitutional amendments are to be successful in democracies, they require the support of 
large majorities. Indeed, more than a century ago, John Burgess (1890: 137) called the rules 
governing formal amendments ‘the most important part of a constitution’. Yet, constitutional rigidity 
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has a low correlation with amendment frequency. This is a puzzle, and other authors have thus 
concluded that these rules do not matter at all and should be replaced by ‘amendment cultures’ 
(Ginsburg & Melton 2015). My answer to the puzzle is that one must first consider the length of the 
constitution and see that this length has a significant impact on time inconsistency – that is, on the 
combination of locking and amendment frequency.  
The usual means to eliminate time inconsistency in the literature is to delegate to an 
independent authority. This is not a possible solution in constitutional matters because there is no 
higher authority than the people. If the people modify a constitution, despite the obstacles included by 
the founders, it means that there were either radically new conditions or a design flaw: potentially 
objectionable provisions were included in the constitution and were protected. These provisions were 
later considered impediments either because the conditions changed or because large majorities 
changed their minds. Therefore, the best way to reduce time inconsistency is to avoid policy making 
and locking through the constitution. Only rules that are widely accepted and not likely to be 
overturned should be locked.  
This is not the only argument in the literature. Ginsburg and Melton (2015: 689; emphasis 
added) say, for instance:  
 
Along with our co-author Zachary Elkins, we have celebrated the virtues of what we might 
call statutory constitutions: those with flexible amendment thresholds that are fairly detailed. 
The constitutions of India, Mexico, and Brazil, to take three prominent examples, are 
amended nearly every year. Such constitutions have the virtue of being frequently changed 
through internal mechanisms, avoiding the costly route of a total replacement. In such 
countries, we argue that the stakes of amendment are lower, and so cultural resistance to 
amend is less than in societies where it is infrequent. 
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It is true that the amendment process in India is particularly easy: it requires simple majorities in both 
chambers (with two-thirds of the members present). In this respect, formally, there is little difference 
between India and a country without a written constitution like the United Kingdom, where 
Parliament can change any law it wants by a simple majority. However, this is not true about Brazil or 
Mexico. Both have long constitutions (68,000 and 57,000 words, respectively) and both constitutions 
are locked. For Brazil, a three-fifths majority is required in both chambers on two different occasions. 
For Mexico, the thresholds are even higher: two-thirds in both chambers, plus a majority of states. 
There may be unobjectionable amendments (women’s rights), but for substantive (i.e., controversial) 
amendments, there will be political battles associated with changes, as well as attempts for 
amendments that are aborted because of the high institutional thresholds.  
As well as criticism of the theoretical foundations and the empirical accuracy of the Ginsburg 
and Melton argument presented in this article, a study of constitutional amendments in Mexico and 
Brazil provides a concrete foundation for the differences in approach of time inconsistency versus 
amendment culture. For the time being, reference to local literature in Brazil and Mexico indicates 
that it is highly unlikely that their constitutions deserve the celebration mentioned by Ginsburg and 
Melton. Analyzing the Brazilian constitution, Couto and Arantes (2008; emphasis added) find that: 
‘The Brazilian constitution of 1988 presents a high rate of constitutional amending, with 62 
amendments in twenty years (3.1 amendments per year); most of them sponsored by the Executive 
branch, aiming at implementing public policies. They argue that there is a high percentage of policy-
making provisions inside the constitution, and create a new measure of constitutional provisions 
resulting in the finding that 30 per cent of them are policy-related.
15
 With respect to the Mexican 
constitution, the analysis is similar:  
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[A]t present it is political parties who dominate the constitutional amendment process. They have 
strong incentives for including their political agreements to the last detail in the constitutional text, in 
order to put them beyond the reach of ordinary legislation, as well as outside the scope of judicial 
review. Nevertheless, these agreements are not always permanent, but are subject to revision in 
generally shorter periods, as is well illustrated by the electoral system. (Fix-Fierro & Valadés 2016: 6) 
 
The analysis presented in this article focuses on time inconsistency. The general approach in 
the time inconsistency literature is that, at the beginning of the game, institutional measures (rules) 
should be taken to prevent time inconsistency from manifesting itself (discretion).
16
 With respect to 
constitutions, the analogy would be that ‘a constitution is Peter sober while the electorate is Peter 
drunk’ (Holmes 1988: 195–196). Both Hayek (2006 [1960]: 157) and Elster (2000) raise objections to 
such an approach. I argue that, given the difficulty of constitutional change, adopted constitutional 
amendments were necessary, and that the restrictions that were included in the original constitution 
are essentially undermining the essence of a document that sets the rules of the game. It would be 
more reasonable to reduce the restrictive provisions (reduce the length), instead of locking the 
constitutions more. Dixon (2014) has divided constitution writing into ‘codified’ and ‘framework’ 
style approaches, and provides legal arguments in favour of the latter style. I provide a similar 
empirically generated argument that long constitutions are restrictive. If my analysis is correct, the 
authors of the first constitution of a country should exercise constraint and not assume that they can 
lock anything they want in the constitution. Doing so leads to long, time-inconsistent documents. But 
this is a ‘retroactive’ suggestion with 20/20 hindsight. A prospective suggestion would be to have the 
people who engage in constitutional revisions to take the time to prune their constitutions. In other 
words, if a certain provision is restrictive, it would be more efficient to just drop it instead of 
replacing it with a different one. 
What the correlation of length with time inconsistency indicates is that too many things are 
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locked in constitutions, with the result that their effectiveness is undermined. Length and locking of 
constitutions is not a matter of culture, but of arrogance and a lack of restriction on the part of 
constitution writers. To quote Jeremy Waldron:   
 
To embody a right in an entrenched constitutional document is to adopt a certain attitude 
towards one’s fellow citizens. That attitude is best summed up as a combination of self-
assurance and mistrust: self-assurance in the proponent’s conviction that what he is putting 
forward really is a matter of fundamental right and that he has captured it adequately in the 
particular formulation he is propounding; and mistrust, implicit in his view that any 
alternative conception that might be concocted by elected legislators next year or in ten years’ 
time is so likely to be wrong-headed or ill motivated that his own formulation is to be 
elevated immediately beyond the reach of ordinary legislative revision. (Waldron 1999: 221–
222) 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This paper was presented in the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg, the 
University of Chicago and the Kellogg Institute at Notre Dame. I thank the participants for their 
comments. I would also like to thank the Kellogg Institute for its financial support through its 
fellowship programme. I thank Julio Ríos-Figueroa, Dominic Nardi and Vassilis Tzevelekos for their 
insightful comments. Finally, I thank Jean Clipperton, Jesse Crosson and Heather Elliott for very 
efficient research assistance. The dataset used in the analysis, as well as the explanation of variables, 
can be found online at: http://sites.lsa.umich.edu/tsebelis/data/constitutional-data/ 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Like transitory provisions (Denmark, Portugal) or idiosyncratic elements, such as the 
description of the flag (Spain, Turkey) or the national anthem (Hungary, El Salvador). 
2. The majority of analyses consider 92 democratic countries. New Zealand, which has a 
collection of documents rather than one constitution, is incorporated into the analyses, 
when data are available.  
3. In this article I will not discuss the case of constitutions being so locked or 
circumstances changing so much as to lead to the adoption of a new constitution (as 
opposed to revisions). 
4. Typically in this literature, the player with time-inconsistent preferences (that prefers to make 
one decision ex ante but changes his or her mind when the time comes) remains the same, but 
his or her preferences change. This is not, however, a necessary physical restriction. For 
example, the minister of finance may or may not change between the creation of an 
independent central bank and elections, but governments still anticipate time-inconsistent 
preferences between these two time periods. Thus, governments opt to create independent 
banks because preferences of the designated actor are likely to be time-inconsistent. 
Similarly, in my analysis, the constitutional restrictions apply to all generations, including the 
one that made the constitution, which can also find itself in front of an unfortunate provision 
that requires fast modification. The creation of collective inter-temporal actors like 
‘government’ or ‘nation’ takes care of this same player restriction. 
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5. Think, for example, the recognition of women’s rights (although in the United States 
the issue did not succeed to clear the constitutional barriers), or, more recently, gay 
rights. 
6. A consequential example of the importance of rules versus culture comes from the history of 
the European Union. A large volume of scholarly papers have identified a ‘preference for 
unanimity’ in the EU (e.g., Tsebelis 2012: 52). According to this literature, unanimous 
decisions are much more frequent than formal models would predict. Aus (2008) calls these 
persistent findings the ‘rationalist puzzle’. Yet, the consensus-oriented EU was unable to 
change its decision-making rules for decades, when unanimity was required. For instance, 
from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the Treaty of Nice in 2001, decisions required a 70–72 
per cent qualified majority of the Council in the weighted system at the time. In order to 
modify it downward to 65 per cent, it took a constitutional convention and a series of attempts 
lasting for almost a decade. (For a history of this process, which ended with the Treaty of 
Lisbon, see Finke et al. 2012.)  
7. Which is exactly what I argued earlier in this article. 
8. For example, with respect to institutional provisions, Cheibub et al. (2014) find serial 
correlations among constitutions. 
9. I created a dependent variable DV(t-1) that was a function of O (t-1) (omitted 
variable) and a series of institutional dummies (A(t-1), B(t-1), C(t-1)). Then, I created 
DV(t), which was a function of DV(t-1) as well as O(t), A(t), B(t), C(t), where all of 
these variables were serially correlated with their previous values. Finally, I 
estimated: DV(t) = DV(t-1) + A(t) + B(t) + C(t). The only significant coefficient was 
DV(t-1), which was significantly inflated over its true value (i.e, the value I 
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constructed the variable). 
10. This figure does not depend on any measurements since the data do not depend on 
variables generated by researchers and are stable (the 2013 data are almost identical 
with the 2006 data in Tsebelis and Nardi 2016). 
11. Polity2 scores were used to determine whether a country was democratic or not. 
Countries with scores of 6 or higher on the Polity2 variable were considered 
democracies. Countries included are limited to countries that were democracies in 
2013. Amendments during years of democracy (Polity2 at 6 or higher) were divided 
by the total number of democratic years (Polity2 at 6 or higher). Note that this is a 
departure from Tsebelis and Nardi (2014) [AQ3], who use 5 instead of 6 as the cutoff 
point and consider only uninterrupted periods, but that the results here are consistent 
with their earlier findings for OECD member countries. 
12. In actuality, I doubt whether accurate information can be collected, because the 
relevant positions of the actors are not in a left-right dimension, but along the issue of 
the constitutional revision under consideration (environment, or powers of the 
president, etc.), which consequently depend on both the subject matter and the 
particular revision. 
13. In a previous version I created a different measure of time inconsistency that was 
leading to the same conclusions. I added the frequency of amendments to 
constitutional rigidity (after normalising both variables so that the units of 
measurement would not matter). The expectation was that the two variables should 
balance each other – that is, more locked constitutions should lead to fewer 
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amendments over time. I thank one of the referees for objecting to the procedure 
because it constrains the variables, and asking for additional analyses, and I thank 
Jesse Crosson for the suggestion of the alternative indicator. Results for the previous 
measure are included in the Appendix Figure 3. 
14. Data on education are not available for all democratic countries, which is why the 
number of observations is reduced when education is used as a control variable. 
15. I thank Rogerio Arantes for familiarising me with his work. 
16. Similarly, philosophy speaks about the ‘weakness of will’ (‘akrasia’ in Plato’s 
Protagoras; Plato 2008: 180–183). 
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Figure 1. Writing and revising the constitution game. 
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Figure 2. Constitutional core with 5/7 or 6/7 qualified majority. 
 
Figure 3. Change of core in one dimension under 5/7 and 6/7 majority. 
 
Figure 4. Core with alternative constitutional provisions. 
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Figure 5. Scope and detail in countries. 
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Figure 6. Corruption and log length. 
 
Table 1. Time inconsistency as a function of constitution length 
DV: Time 
Inconsistency 
OECD 
Measure 1 
DEMOC 
Measure 1 
OECD 
Measure 2 
DEMOC 
Measure 2 
OECD 
Measure 3 
DEMOC 
Measure 3 
Log Length 0.516*** 0.276*** 0.523*** 0.283*** 0.489** 0.274*** 
 
(0.140) (0.083) (0.139) (0.082) (0.140) (0.083) 
Constant –2.148*** –1.180*** –2.176*** –1.211*** –2.012** –1.175*** 
 (0.580) (0.355) (0.576) (0.354) (0.582) (0.358) 
R
2 
0.314 0.113 0.322 0.119 0.289 0.111 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
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Table 2. Constitutional length as a function of country characteristics 
DV: Log Length OECD DEMOC OECD DEMOC 
Detail (calc) 3.467*** (0.49) 1.774*** (0.43) 3.424*** (0.53) 1.766*** (0.44) 
Federalism –0.043 (0.06) –0.041 (0.04) –0.045 (0.06) –0.041 (0.04) 
Age of Democracy –0.003* (0.00) –0.003*** (0.00) –0.003 (0.00) –0.003** (0.00) 
Legal Origins 0.091 (0.08) 0.035 (0.06) 0.100 (0.11) 0.037 (0.06) 
# Amendments   0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 
Constant 3.894*** (0.10) 4.089*** (0.09) 3.900*** (0.11) 4.089*** (0.09) 
     R
2
 0.8583 0.7521 0.8585 0.7521 
N 32 88 32 88 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
 
Table 3. GDP per capita as a function of constitutional length, and economic variables 
DV: logGDP OECD DEMOC OECD DEMOC 
Length (log) –0.29** (0.10) –0.46** (0.15) –0.267* (0.16) –0.215* (0.099) 
Education   0.0008 (0.007) 0.007*** (0.002) 
Natural Resources   0.002 (0.007) –0.004 (0.005) 
Trade   0.0008 (0.0006) 0.0003 (0.001) 
Investment   –0.014* (0.006) –0.013+ (0.008) 
Constant 5.73*** (0.43) 6.04*** (0.65) 5.821*** (0.466) 5.035*** (0.524) 
     
R
2
  0.2605 0.0805 0.422 0.312 
N 32 90 30 68 
Note: [AQ1]. 
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Table 4. GDP per capita as a function of length, economic variables, education and corruption 
DV: logGDP OECD DEMOC OECD DEMOC 
Length (log) –0.267* (0.16) –0.215* (0.099) –0.070 (0.100) –0.028 (0.078) 
Education 0.0008 (0.007) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.000008 (0.0009) 0.003* (0.001) 
Natural Resources 0.002 (0.007) –0.004 (0.005) –0.001 (0.008) 0.0004 (0.004) 
Trade 0.0008 (0.0006) 0.0003 (0.001) 0.0009 (0.0005) 0.0005 (0.0005) 
Investment –0.014* (0.006) –0.013+ (0.008) –0.004 (0.006) –0.003 (0.005) 
Corruption (TPI)   –0.053*** (0.011) –0.109*** (0.011) 
Adjusted Corruption [AQ2]    
Constant 5.821*** (0.466) 5.035*** (0.524) 4.464*** (0.544) 3.643*** (0.425) 
     
R
2
 0.422 0.312 0.672 0.741 
N 30 68 30 68 
Note: [AQ1]. 
 
 
Table 5. GDP per capita regressed on detail, corruption and other variables 
DV: logGDP OECD DEMOC OECD DEMOC 
Detail –0.959* (0.297) –0.200 (0.163) –0.547* (0.260) –0.362* (0.168) 
# Amendments 0.009** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.004* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Education 0.009 (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) –0.0007 (0.0008) 0.002* (0.001) 
Natural Resources –0.005 (0.005) 0.0007 (0.004) –0.010* (0.005) –0.005 (0.004) 
Trade 0.0006 (0.0006) 0.0005 (0.005) –0.0002 (0.0004) –0.0001 (0.0004) 
Investment 0.002 (0.006) –0.002 (0.004)   
     
Savings   0.009* (0.003) 0.009*** (0.002) 
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Corruption (TPI) –0.045*** (0.011) –0.107*** (0.013) –0.039*** (0.124) –0.080*** (0.011) 
Constant 4.166*** (0.190) 3.556*** (0.139) 4.120*** (0.124) 3.565*** (0.100) 
R
2
 0.759 0.745 0.815 0.804 
N 30 68 30 68 
Note: [AQ1]. 
 
